How can a group of agents aggregate their individually assigned truth-values to a collection of logically related propositions into a consistent aggregate? This is a social choice problem studied by the theory of judgment aggregation. A relatively new problem of social choice, much is unknown about the theory, methods, implementation and application of judgment aggregation.

In the past decade we witnessed the role of a computer shifting from the computer being a self contained machine for executing software, a ``personal computer", to being a ``net-book", a global communication tool and an access node for disseminating information. As computers and computing become more distributed, pervasive and invisible, the need is created for aggregating information from various sources into a consistent aggregate. Can judgment aggregation fill this need? This is the topic of the workshop organized by the ICR group at the University of Luxembourg.

To answer the workshop question, researchers need to work on both the judgment aggregation theory side and multiagent system side. Both of these disciplines are highly interdisciplinary, reflected in the research interests of the invited speakers.


Thesis defence

Marija Slavkovik

15:00; Room A02;Campus Kirchberg

Computational social choice is an increasingly popular area of research concerned with the bilateral exchange of ideas and methods between social choice theory and computer science. In the past ten years computational analysis to social choice rules has been the main topic explored.

Marija's thesis, titled "Judgment aggregation for multiagent systems", explores the use of judgment aggregation rules for reaching consents among intelligent agents, thus contributing to the social choice into computer science direction of computational social choice. The thesis considers the questions of designing, selecting and applying judgment aggregation rules for multiagent systems.