Rational norm creation: attributing mental attitudes to normative systems, part 2 (bibtex)
by Guido Boella, Leendert van der Torre
Abstract:
If a legislator introduces a new norm in a normative system, then rationality prescribes that it ensures that the norm can and will be fulfilled by agents subjected to the norm. Since agents may not follow the law, it associates sanctions with norms. But even with sanction-based obligations, some agents will look for ways to violate the norm while at the same time evading the sanction, for example by making sure that their violation will not be noticed, blocking the sanction, bribing the system, et cetera. Consequently, to reason about the creation of norms, we need a model of norm-evading agents. In [2] we argue that a model of normevading agents can be based on the attribution of mental attitudes to normative systems. In this paper we address the following two questions:1. How can the attribution of mental attitudes to normative systems be used to reason about norm creation?2. How can we formalize norm creation using the attribution of mental attitudes to normative systems?
Reference:
Rational norm creation: attributing mental attitudes to normative systems, part 2 (Guido Boella, Leendert van der Torre), In Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Artificial intelligence and law, ACM, 2003.
Bibtex Entry:
@InProceedings{Boella2003b,
  Title                    = {Rational norm creation: attributing mental attitudes to normative systems, part 2},
  Author                   = {Boella, Guido and van der Torre, Leendert},
  Booktitle                = {Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Artificial intelligence and law},
  Year                     = {2003},

  Address                  = {New York, NY, USA},
  Pages                    = {81--82},
  Publisher                = {ACM},
  Series                   = {ICAIL '03},

  Abstract                 = {If a legislator introduces a new norm in a normative system, then rationality prescribes that it ensures that the norm can and will be fulfilled by agents subjected to the norm. Since agents may not follow the law, it associates sanctions with norms. But even with sanction-based obligations, some agents will look for ways to violate the norm while at the same time evading the sanction, for example by making sure that their violation will not be noticed, blocking the sanction, bribing the system, et cetera. Consequently, to reason about the creation of norms, we need a model of norm-evading agents. In [2] we argue that a model of normevading agents can be based on the attribution of mental attitudes to normative systems. In this paper we address the following two questions:1. How can the attribution of mental attitudes to normative systems be used to reason about norm creation?2. How can we formalize norm creation using the attribution of mental attitudes to normative systems?},
  Acmid                    = {1047803},
  Doi                      = {10.1145/1047788.1047803},
  ISBN                     = {1-58113-747-8},
  Location                 = {Scotland, United Kingdom},
  Numpages                 = {2},
  Timestamp                = {2013.07.26},
  Url                      = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1047788.1047803}
}
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