Division of Powers in MAS Control (bibtex)
by G. Boella, L. van der Torre
Abstract:
Decision making in multiagent systems has to deal with the norms regulating the system. In this paper we propose a logical framework based on three dimensions. First, we distinguish between agents whose behavior is governed by norms, defenders of these norms and autonomous normative systems; in this paper we call the latter two normative agents. Second, we distinguish some of the usual mental attitudes for all agents, including the normative agents. Third, we distinguish between behavior that counts as a violation, and sanctions that are applied. To formalize decision making we also extend this framework to a qualitative game theory. n-player games are based on recursive modelling: the bearer of obligations models the defender agents who have the duty to monitor violations and to apply sanctions, which in turn model the normative systems, which issue the norms and watch over the behavior of these defender agents. We show how normative systems can delegate monitoring and sanctioning of violations to autonomous defender agents, inspired by Montesquieu's trias politica.
Reference:
Division of Powers in MAS Control (G. Boella, L. van der Torre), In Procs. of AAMAS Workshop on Autonomy, Delegation and Control, 2003.
Bibtex Entry:
@InProceedings{Boella2003e,
  Title                    = {Division of Powers in MAS Control},
  Author                   = {G. Boella and L. van der Torre},
  Booktitle                = {Procs. of AAMAS Workshop on Autonomy, Delegation and Control},
  Year                     = {2003},

  Address                  = {Melbourne},

  Abstract                 = {Decision making in multiagent systems has to deal with the norms regulating the system. In this paper we propose a logical framework based on three dimensions. First, we distinguish between agents whose behavior is governed by norms, defenders of these norms and autonomous normative systems; in this paper we call the latter two normative agents. Second, we distinguish some of the usual mental attitudes for all agents, including the normative agents. Third, we distinguish between behavior that counts as a violation, and sanctions that are applied. To formalize decision making we also extend this framework to a qualitative game theory. n-player games are based on recursive modelling: the bearer of obligations models the defender agents who have the duty to monitor violations and to apply sanctions, which in turn model the normative systems, which issue the norms and watch over the behavior of these defender agents. We show how normative systems can delegate monitoring and sanctioning of violations to autonomous defender agents, inspired by Montesquieu's trias politica.},
  Bdsk-url-1               = {http://icr.uni.lu/leonvandertorre/papers/adc03.pdf},
  Timestamp                = {2013.07.26},
  Url                      = {http://icr.uni.lu/leonvandertorre/papers/adc03.pdf}
}
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