Introduction to normative multiagent systems (bibtex)
by G. Boella, L. van der Torre, H. Verhagen
Abstract:
In this paper we use recursive modelling to formalize sanction-based obligations in a qualitative game theory. In particular, we formalize an agent who attributes mental attitudes such as goals and desires to the normative system which creates and enforces its obligations. The wishes (goals, desires) of the normative system are the commands (obligations) of the agent. Since the agent is able to reason about the normative system's behavior, our model accounts for many ways in which an agent can violate a norm believing that it will not be sanctioned. The theory can be used in theories or applications that need a model of rational decision making in normative multiagent systems, such as for example theories of fraud and deception, trust dynamics and reputation, electronic commerce, and virtual communities.
Reference:
Introduction to normative multiagent systems (G. Boella, L. van der Torre, H. Verhagen), In Computation and Mathematical Organizational Theory, Special issue on Normative Multiagent Systems, volume 12, 2006.
Bibtex Entry:
@Article{Boella2006a,
  Title                    = {Introduction to normative multiagent systems},
  Author                   = {G. Boella and L. van der Torre and H. Verhagen},
  Journal                  = {Computation and Mathematical Organizational Theory, Special issue on Normative Multiagent Systems},
  Year                     = {2006},
  Number                   = {2-3},
  Pages                    = {71-79},
  Volume                   = {12},

  Abstract                 = {In this paper we use recursive modelling to formalize sanction-based obligations in a qualitative game theory. In particular, we formalize an agent who attributes mental attitudes such as goals and desires to the normative system which creates and enforces its obligations. The wishes (goals, desires) of the normative system are the commands (obligations) of the agent. Since the agent is able to reason about the normative system's behavior, our model accounts for many ways in which an agent can violate a norm believing that it will not be sanctioned. The theory can be used in theories or applications that need a model of rational decision making in normative multiagent systems, such as for example theories of fraud and deception, trust dynamics and reputation, electronic commerce, and virtual communities.},
  Affiliation              = {icr},
  Bdsk-url-1               = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/9508t27tr9279617/},
  Timestamp                = {2013.07.26},
  Url                      = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/9508t27tr9279617/}
}
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