An Attacker Model for Normative Multi-agent Systems (bibtex)
by Leendert W.N. van der Torre Guido Boella
Abstract:
Procedural norms are instrumental norms addressed to agents playing a role in the normative system, for example to motivate these role playing agents to recognize violations or to apply sanctions. Procedural norms have first been discussed in law, where they address legal practitioners such as legislators, lawyers and policemen, but they are discussed now too in normative multiagent systems to motivate software agents. Procedural norms aim to achieve the social order specified using regulative norms like obligations and permissions, and constitutive norms like counts-as obligations. In this paper we formalize procedural, regulative and constitutive norms using input/output logic enriched with an agent ontology and an abstraction hierarchy. We show how our formalization explains Castelfranchi's notion of mutual empowerment, stating that not only the agents playing a role in a normative system are empowered by the normative system, but the normative system itself is also empowered by the agents playing a role in it. In our terminology, the agents are not only institutionally empowered, but they are also delegated normative goals from the system. Together, institutional empowerment and normative goal delegation constitute a mechanism which we call delegation of power, where agents acting on behalf of the normative system become in charge of recognizing which institutional facts follow from brute facts.
Reference:
An Attacker Model for Normative Multi-agent Systems (Leendert W.N. van der Torre Guido Boella), In Multi-Agent Systems and Applications V, 5th International Central and Eastern European Conference on Multi-Agent Systems, CEEMAS 2007, Leipzig, Germany, September 25-27, 2007, Proceedings (Hans-Dieter Burkhard, Gabriela Lindemann, László Zsolt Varga Rineke Verbrugge, eds.), Springer, volume 4696, 2007.
Bibtex Entry:
@InProceedings{GuidoBoella2007,
  Title                    = {An Attacker Model for Normative Multi-agent Systems},
  Author                   = {Guido Boella, Leendert W.N. van der Torre},
  Booktitle                = {Multi-Agent Systems and Applications V, 5th International Central and Eastern European Conference on Multi-Agent Systems, CEEMAS 2007, Leipzig, Germany, September 25-27, 2007, Proceedings},
  Year                     = {2007},
  Editor                   = {Hans-Dieter Burkhard and Gabriela Lindemann and Rineke Verbrugge, L{\'{a}}szl{\'{o}} Zsolt Varga},
  Pages                    = {42-51},
  Publisher                = {Springer},
  Series                   = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
  Volume                   = {4696},

  Abstract                 = {Procedural norms are instrumental norms addressed to agents playing a role in the normative system, for example to motivate these role playing agents to recognize violations or to apply sanctions. Procedural norms have first been discussed in law, where they address legal practitioners such as legislators, lawyers and policemen, but they are discussed now too in normative multiagent systems to motivate software agents. Procedural norms aim to achieve the social order specified using regulative norms like obligations and permissions, and constitutive norms like counts-as obligations. In this paper we formalize procedural, regulative and constitutive norms using input/output logic enriched with an agent ontology and an abstraction hierarchy. We show how our formalization explains Castelfranchi's notion of mutual empowerment, stating that not only the agents playing a role in a normative system are empowered by the normative system, but the normative system itself is also empowered by the agents playing a role in it. In our terminology, the agents are not only institutionally empowered, but they are also delegated normative goals from the system. Together, institutional empowerment and normative goal delegation constitute a mechanism which we call delegation of power, where agents acting on behalf of the normative system become in charge of recognizing which institutional facts follow from brute facts.},
  Affiliation              = {icr},
  Bdsk-url-1               = {http://icr.uni.lu/leonvandertorre/papers/jal08.pdf},
  Timestamp                = {2013.07.26},
  Url                      = {http://icr.uni.lu/leonvandertorre/papers/jal08.pdf}
}
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