Dependency in Cooperative Boolean Games (bibtex)
by Luigi Sauro, Leendert van der Torre, Serena Villata
Abstract:
Cooperative boolean games are coalitional games with both goals and costs associated to actions, and dependence networks for boolean games are a kind of social networks representing how the actions of other agents have an influence on the achievement of an agent's goal. In this paper, we introduce two new types of dependence networks, called the abstract dependence network and the refined dependence network. Moreover, we show that the notion of stability is complete with respect to the solution concept of the core in the case of cooperative boolean games with costly actions. We present a reduction, called Delta-reduction, to pass from a cooperative boolean game G to game G′ without loosing solutions.
Reference:
Dependency in Cooperative Boolean Games (Luigi Sauro, Leendert van der Torre, Serena Villata), In Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications, Third KES International Symposium, KES-AMSTA 2009, Uppsala, Sweden, June 3-5, 2009. Proceedings (Anne Håkansson, Ngoc Thanh Nguyen, Ronald L. Hartung, Robert J. Howlett, Lakhmi C. Jain, eds.), Springer, volume 5559, 2009.
Bibtex Entry:
@InProceedings{Sauro2009,
  Title                    = {Dependency in Cooperative Boolean Games},
  Author                   = {Luigi Sauro and Leendert van der Torre and Serena Villata},
  Booktitle                = {Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications, Third KES International Symposium, KES-AMSTA 2009, Uppsala, Sweden, June 3-5, 2009. Proceedings},
  Year                     = {2009},
  Editor                   = {Anne H{\aa}kansson and Ngoc Thanh Nguyen and Ronald L. Hartung and Robert J. Howlett and Lakhmi C. Jain},
  Pages                    = {1-10},
  Publisher                = {Springer},
  Series                   = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
  Volume                   = {5559},

  Abstract                 = {Cooperative boolean games are coalitional games with both goals and costs associated to actions, and dependence networks for boolean games are a kind of social networks representing how the actions of other agents have an influence on the achievement of an agent's goal. In this paper, we introduce two new types of dependence networks, called the abstract dependence network and the refined dependence network. Moreover, we show that the notion of stability is complete with respect to the solution concept of the core in the case of cooperative boolean games with costly actions. We present a reduction, called Delta-reduction, to pass from a cooperative boolean game G to game G′ without loosing solutions.},
  Affiliation              = {icr},
  Bdsk-url-1               = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01665-3_1},
  Bibsource                = {DBLP, http://dblp.uni-trier.de},
  Date-modified            = {2011-09-25 17:44:23 +0200},
  Ee                       = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01665-3_1},
  ISBN                     = {978-3-642-01664-6},
  Timestamp                = {2013.07.26},
  Url                      = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01665-3_1}
}
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