Prohairetic Deontic Logic (PDL) (bibtex)
by L. van der Torre, Y. Tan
Abstract:
In this paper we introduce Prohairetic Deontic Logic (PDL), a preference-based dyadic deontic logic. An obligation ‘α should be (done) if β is (done)’ is true if (1) no ¬α∧β state is as preferable as an α∧β state and (2) the preferred β states are α states. We show that the different elements of this mixed representation solve different problems of deontic logic. The first part of the definition is used to formalize contrary-to-duty reasoning, that for example occurs in Chisholm’s and Forrester’s notorious deontic paradoxes. The second part is used to make dilemmas inconsistent. PDL shares the intuitive semantics of preference-based deontic logics without introducing additional semantic machinery such as bi-ordering semantics or ceteris paribus preferences.
Reference:
Prohairetic Deontic Logic (PDL) (L. van der Torre, Y. Tan), In Logics in Artificial Intelligence. Proceedings of the 6th European Workshop on Logics in AI (JELIA'98), Springer, volume 1489, 1998.
Bibtex Entry:
@InProceedings{Torre1998i,
  Title                    = {Prohairetic Deontic Logic (PDL)},
  Author                   = {van der Torre, L. and Tan, Y.},
  Booktitle                = {Logics in Artificial Intelligence. Proceedings of the 6th European Workshop on Logics in AI (JELIA'98)},
  Year                     = {1998},
  Pages                    = {77-91},
  Publisher                = {Springer},
  Series                   = {LNAI},
  Volume                   = {1489},

  Abstract                 = {In this paper we introduce Prohairetic Deontic Logic (PDL), a preference-based dyadic deontic logic. An obligation ‘α should be (done) if β is (done)’ is true if (1) no ¬α∧β state is as preferable as an α∧β state and (2) the preferred β states are α states. We show that the different elements of this mixed representation solve different problems of deontic logic. The first part of the definition is used to formalize contrary-to-duty reasoning, that for example occurs in Chisholm’s and Forrester’s notorious deontic paradoxes. The second part is used to make dilemmas inconsistent. PDL shares the intuitive semantics of preference-based deontic logics without introducing additional semantic machinery such as bi-ordering semantics or ceteris paribus preferences. },
  Timestamp                = {2013.07.26},
  Url                      = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/gwactbelcpx3y2rc}
}
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