An Update Semantics for Defeasible Obligations (bibtex)
by Leendert W. N. van der Torre, Yao-Hua Tan
Abstract:
The deontic logic DUS is a Deontic Update Semantics for prescriptive obligations based on the update semantics of Veltman. In DUS the definition of logical validity of obligations is not based on static truth values but on dynamic action transitions. In this paper prescriptive defeasible obligations are formalized in update semantics and the diagnostic problem of defeasible deontic logic is discussed. Assume a defeasible obligation `normally A ought to be (done)' together with the fact `A is not (done).' Is this an exception of the normality claim, or is it a violation of the obligation? In this paper we formalize the heuristic principle that it is a violation, unless there is a more specific overriding obligation. The underlying motivation from legal reasoning is that criminals should have as little opportunities as possible to excuse themselves by claiming that their behavior was exceptional rather than criminal.
Reference:
An Update Semantics for Defeasible Obligations (Leendert W. N. van der Torre, Yao-Hua Tan), In UAI, 1999.
Bibtex Entry:
@InProceedings{Torre1999a,
  Title                    = {An Update Semantics for Defeasible Obligations},
  Author                   = {Leendert W. N. van der Torre and Yao-Hua Tan},
  Booktitle                = {UAI},
  Year                     = {1999},
  Pages                    = {631-638},

  Abstract                 = {The deontic logic DUS is a Deontic Update Semantics for prescriptive obligations based on the update semantics of Veltman. In DUS the definition of logical validity of obligations is not based on static truth values but on dynamic action transitions. In this paper prescriptive defeasible obligations are formalized in update semantics and the diagnostic problem of defeasible deontic logic is discussed. Assume a defeasible obligation `normally A ought to be (done)' together with the fact `A is not (done).' Is this an exception of the normality claim, or is it a violation of the obligation? In this paper we formalize the heuristic principle that it is a violation, unless there is a more specific overriding obligation. The underlying motivation from legal reasoning is that criminals should have as little opportunities as possible to excuse themselves by claiming that their behavior was exceptional rather than criminal.},
  Bdsk-url-1               = {http://icr.uni.lu/leonvandertorre/papers/uai99.ps.Z},
  Bibsource                = {DBLP, http://dblp.uni-trier.de},
  Crossref                 = {DBLP:conf/uai/1999},
  Ee                       = {http://rome.exp.sis.pitt.edu/UAI/Abstract.asp?articleID=217{\&}proceedingID=15},
  Slides                   = {http://icr.uni.lu/leonvandertorre/papers/uai99-slides.ps.Z},
  Timestamp                = {2013.07.26},
  Url                      = {http://icr.uni.lu/leonvandertorre/papers/uai99.ps.Z}
}
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