@article{DBLP:journals/ail/BroersenT03,
  abstract = {John Horty s book Agency and Deontic Logic appeared at Oxford University Press in 2001. It develops deontic logic against the background of a theory of agency in non-deterministic time. Several philosophical reviews of the book appeared since then (Bartha 2002; Czelakowski 2002; Danielsson 2002; McNamara 2003; Wansing 2003). Our goal is to present the book to a general AI audience that is familiar with action theories developed in AI, classical decision theory (Savage 1954), or formalizations of temporal reasoning like Computation Tree Logic (CTL) (Clarke et al. 1986; Emerson 1990). Therefore, in contrast to the philosophical reviews, we discuss and explain several key examples in the book. We do not explicitly discuss the relevance for AI and law, because the book itself is not concerned with the application of the theory to the legal domain. However, the relevance of deontic logic and normative reasoning for legal reasoning is well established by a number of publications on deontic logic in AI and law, see for example the special issue of this journal on agents and norms (volume 4, 1999). },
  author = {Jan Broersen and Leendert W. N. van der Torre},
  bibsource = {DBLP, http://dblp.uni-trier.de},
  ee = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:ARTI.0000013352.63798.08},
  journal = {Artif. Intell. Law},
  number = {1},
  pages = {45-61},
  title = {What an Agent Ought To Do},
  url = {http://ipsapp009.kluweronline.com/content/getfile/4521/18/4/abstract.htm},
  volume = {11},
  year = {2003},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://ipsapp009.kluweronline.com/content/getfile/4521/18/4/abstract.htm}
}