Program
| 13:00-13:45 | Knowing More, Now and Here: Towards a Local Correspondence Theory (Invited talk) Wiebe van der Hoek |
| 13:45-14:10 | The dynamic logic of propositional control Andreas Herzig and Nicolas Troquard |
| 14:10-14:35 | A Logical Account of Mindreading Michal Sindlar, Mehdi Dastani and John-Jules Meyer |
| 14:35-15:00 | Becoming aware Hans van Ditmarsch and Tim French |
| 15:00-15:30 | Coffee break |
| 15:30-16:15 | Standard Deontic Logic is Dead - Towards a New Standard for
Normative Reasoning (Invited talk) Leon van der Torre |
| 16:15-16:40 | Graded Beliefs, Goals and Intentions Barbara Dunin-Keplicz, Linh Anh Nguyen and Andrzej Szałas |
| 16:40-17:05 | Coordination, Almost Perfect Information and Strategic Ability Peter Hawke |
| 17:05-17:20 | Short break |
| 17:20-18:00 | General discussion, including discussion on the LAMAS initiative |
Invited talks
Knowing More, Now and Here
Towards a Local Correspondence Theory
Wiebe van der Hoek
Joint work with Hans van Ditmarsch and Barteld Kooi
If one wants to express that agent a knows at least what agent b knows, one would in modal logic typically add an axiom of the form
Ax: Kbφ -> Kaφ
to the logic. However, this makes the constraint a global property: an axiom like Ax will be automatically common knowledge to all agents, and if one has for instance also temporal or dynamic operators in the language, the axiom Ax guarantees that a will always know at least what b knows, no matter which actions or moves in a game are performed.
Would it not be interesting to be able to express that right now, agent a knows everything that b knows, but agent c does not know that? Or, that, momentarily, a does not know more than b, but if c would inform a about a specific secret, a would know at least what b knows?
In our talk we present a logic for a `local' notion of knowing more. We also briefly reflect on making general notions in modal logic (like veridicality: what one believes is true) local to the current situation, and not automatically known to all agents.
Standard Deontic Logic is Dead
Towards a New Standard for Normative Reasoning
Leon van der Torre
In this talk, we first consider l'histoire d'O. Soon after its inception in 1951, Standard Deontic Logic was taken to intensive care. Due to a variety of conceptual and technical problems, it was not taken up in the areas it was developed for, like ethics, linguistics, law, or more recently computer science. Nevertheless, and despite its many flaws, modal logicians have several times tried to bring it back to life using, for example, dyadic operators in the sixties and seventies, or dynamic operators in the eighties and nineties. While writing the first handbook on deontic logic and normative systems, now it is becoming clear that this tradition is becoming a dead end. This raises the question we address in the second part of this talk: who or what killed Standard Deontic Logic, and what are the candidates for a new standard?