Feb01
Workshop Program
- 9:15-10:00 Franz Dietrich
- 10:00-10:45 Ulle Endriss
- 11:15-12:00 Sebastien Konieczny
Jury Theorem under Uncertainty
- 12:00-12:45 Marija Slavkovik
Aggregating weighted judgments
- 14:00-14:45 Elad Dokow
- 14:45-15:30 Michel Regenwetter
Behavioral Social Choice: What is it?
- 16:00-16:45 Gabriella Pigozzi
Legitimate judgment aggregation (joint works with Martin Caminada and Umberto Grandi)
Ontology Merging as Social Choice (work with Daniele Porello)
Models of Manipulation on Aggregation of Binary Evaluations (work with Dvir Falik)
We study a general aggregation problem in which a society has to determine its position on each of several issues, based on the positions of the members of the society on those issues. There is a prescribed set of feasible evaluations, i.e., permissible combinations of positions on the issues. Among other things, this framework admits the modeling of preference aggregation, judgment aggregation, classification, clustering and facility location. An important notion in aggregation of evaluations is strategy-proofness. In the general framework wediscuss here, several definitions of strategy-proofness may be considered. We present here 3 natural general definitions of strategy-proofness and analyze the possibility of designing an annonymous, strategy-proof aggregation rule under these definitions.