Feb01

Workshop Program

  • 9:15-10:00 Franz Dietrich

    Scoring rules for judgment aggregation

    Slides

    Paper

  • 10:00-10:45 Ulle Endriss
  • Ontology Merging as Social Choice (work with Daniele Porello)

    Slides

    Paper

  • 11:15-12:00 Sebastien Konieczny

    Jury Theorem under Uncertainty

    Slides

    Paper

  • 12:00-12:45 Marija Slavkovik

    Aggregating weighted judgments

    Slides

  • 14:00-14:45 Elad Dokow
  • Models of Manipulation on Aggregation of Binary Evaluations (work with Dvir Falik)

    We study a general aggregation problem in which a society has to determine its position on each of several issues, based on the positions of the members of the society on those issues. There is a prescribed set of feasible evaluations, i.e., permissible combinations of positions on the issues. Among other things, this framework admits the modeling of preference aggregation, judgment aggregation, classification, clustering and facility location. An important notion in aggregation of evaluations is strategy-proofness. In the general framework wediscuss here, several definitions of strategy-proofness may be considered. We present here 3 natural general definitions of strategy-proofness and analyze the possibility of designing an annonymous, strategy-proof aggregation rule under these definitions.

  • 14:45-15:30 Michel Regenwetter

    Behavioral Social Choice: What is it?

    Slides

    Book

    Book

    Paper

  • 16:00-16:45 Gabriella Pigozzi

    Legitimate judgment aggregation (joint works with Martin Caminada and Umberto Grandi)

    Slides

    Paper